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LIENS IN AIRCRAFT: PRIORITIES
By MICHAEL SCOTT
University of Michigan School of Law
This paper recently brought to its author the second annual Braniff
Essay Award in Aviation Law, an award established in memory of
the late Thomas E. Braniff, airline pioneer, by Roger J. White ford
and Hubert A. Schneider of the law firm of Whiteford, Hart, Carmody
and Wilson, Washington, D.' C.
U NLIKE the relatively settled subject of priority among maritime
liens, the seniority inter se of liens and other security interests
in aircraft is a subject fraught with uncertainty. Modern federal legis-
lation protecting the interests of secured creditors has to a limited
extent brought clarity to the aircraft priority question, but the com-
parative plethora of judicial interpretation upon the relation of this
legislation to state statutes and previously existing precedents leaves
numerous problems either unanswered or untouched. Legal commen-
tators and judges have evinced considerable reluctance to state prin-
ciples more br6adly than precisely necessary to decide a particular
case-in rather remarkable contrast to their brethren in admiralty, who
in the past thirty years through general dicta or definitive writing have
attempted, with at least partial success, to reconcile conflicting decisions
and theories into a workable system of priority law.
The author is not so presumptuous as to suggest this article as a
definitive work upon the subject of priority of liens in aircraft. Neither
his experience nor the state of the law permits such an attempt. The
purpose here is rather primarily to collect statutory material and judi-
cial precedent specifically concerning aircraft lien priorities. An effort
will be made to examine the theoretical basis for present ideas on
priority and to a limited degree, reconciliation and interpretation of
the decisions, together with suggestions for improvements in the law,
will be undertaken. It is hoped, then, that with this material as one
starting point, aviation law practitioners may be able to press the
evolution, in courts and legislatures, of a more certain system of priori-
ties for aircraft liens.
THE COMPETING ANALOGIES
The history of the aircraft lien is necessarily a short one. Because
this is so, aircraft priority doctrines have been drawn-often uncon-
sciously-from two traditional sources of priority law: the common law
and the maritime law. While it is not feasible to depict either source in
more than general terms, definition of a few first principles in both
systems is warranted in understanding modern aircraft lien statutes
and decisions.
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1. Common law. Although undermined by myriad exceptions and
ignored frequently in statutory priority schemes, the ancient time-
sequence maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure is still the basic
axiom of common law lien priority. Absent contrary statute, two liens
of the same nature created one before the other will be assigned rank
upon the basis that "he who is prior in time is prior in right."1 But this
exact factual situation seldom occcurs today-liens are most often
created and given priority by statute or contract exclusive of common
law principles. 2
Also found at common law is the traditional deference paid to the
"common law" lien belonging to the artisan, which has often been
termed prior in right to all others, including antecedent statutory
liens.3 Lip service is given to this principle even today, but many
statutes-such as recording acts-have changed this result in the peren-
nial contest between recording mortgagee and a subsequent repair-
man.4 Those statutes which give preference to the latter do so most
often upon the theory of implied consent of the owner of the security
interest rather than because of the innate superiority of the common
law lien.5
There is little to be gained here from a detailed study of the federal
and state statutory schemes which have modified the common law.
Suffice it to say that in determining priority among liens in aircraft,
a court might look to the common law for two ancient principles: the
time-right doctrine, and the generally-recognized superior position of
the common law lien. That it will not apply them because of contrary
statutory mandate will often be the case, but on the other hand, priority
legislation with respect to the aircraft is infrequent and incomplete,
so that resort to these or other principles outside the statute may well
be necessary.
2. Maritime law. In direct contrast with the common law time-right
I See e.g. Portneuf-March Valley Canal Co. v. Brown, 274 U.S. 630 (1927);
U.S. v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953). See generally IV American
Law of Property, §§ 17.1-17.3 (1952).
2 IV American Law of Property, § 16.106F (1952) ; Brown, Personal Property
(2nd ed.) § 112 (1986).
3 See e.g. Whitefield Village Fire Dist. v. Bobst, 93 N.H. 229, 39 A. (2d) 566
(1944); Sullivan v. Clifton, 55 N.J.L. 324, 26 A. 964 (1893); Shaw v. Webb, 131
Tenn. 173, 174 S.W. 273 (1914).
4 See Brown, Personal Property (2nd ed.) § 112 (1936).
5 "It will be noticed that the basis of the implied authority in the mortgagor
to contract for repairs is in part the fact that the mortgagor depended on the opera-
tion of the vessel to secure him funds to retire the mortgage which existed thereon.
This circumstance has been fixed upon by several later courts to work out an
authority in the vendee or mortgagee in possession to contract for repairs on the
encumbered chattel and to submit the same to the lien of the party making them.
Other cases preferring the lien of the mechanic to that of the prior mortgage or
conditional sale have, however, generally not considered this element as important,
so that even without it an implied authority to contract for repairs is found to exist.
It is said that the vendor or mortgagee expects and intends that his debtor shall
keep the encumbered chattel in his possession. If as is frequently the case, such
chattel is an automobile or other vehicle, it is known that in its operation it will
require repairs. Such repairs will be of benefit both to the lien creditor in protecting
his security, and to the lien debtor in enabling him to continue to enjoy possession.
Consent to the contracting for such repairs is therefor implied." Brown, Personal
Property § 112 (1935).
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rule, priority among maritime liens is traditionally determined in the
inverse order of time of accrual, so that theoretically at least, the most
recent lien takes precedence over all earlier liens.6 Two justifications
are offered for the doctrine: (1) each lienor performing services for
the vessel becomes a part owner of the vessel (not unlike the common
law lienor), and as such, faces the possibility that "his" vessel may
become subject to further liens as the voyage continues; and (2) the
last lienor, in performing services for the vessel, permits it to continue
on its voyage, thereby benefiting all previous lienors and therefore
deserving seniority in right.7 Although both of these theories are sub-
ject to severe cuestion s there is no doubt that inverse priority con-
tinues to be a basic tenet of the maritime scheme. It has been subverted
to the extent that many admiralty courts will now select a convenient
period of time-a voyage, ninety days, or a calendar year-and declare
that all liens accruing within that period are of equal priority among
themselves, time-wise.9 Time is then significant only in the ranking
of liens accruing on independent succeeding voyages or periods, be-
tween which the inverse time priority principle still prevails.
Superimposed upon this system, however, is the more significant
ranking of maritime liens by classi 0-a priority scheme which becomes
all-important when the competing liens all arise within a single period
of computation. A highly acceptable statement of the modern view of
this class-ranking, approved by commentators and generally borne out
by the decisions, is the dictum found in The William Leishear:
".... to-day it is possible to deduce, from the decisions, the following
order of priority, existing irrespective of time, which represents
the weight of authority: (1) Seaman's wages; (2) salvage; (3)
tort and collision liens; (4) repairs, supplies, towage, wharfage,
pilotage, and other necessaries; ... (6) non-maritime claims."'"
To this list must be added the "preferred mortgage" obtained pursuant
to the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.12 This mortgage, if properly drawn
6 The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. 409 (1824); The Eugenia Emilia, (D.C. Mass.
1924) 298 F. 340. See generally, Connor, "Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-Currents
of Theory," 54 Mich. L. Rev. 777 at 781 et seq. (1956).
7 The William Leishear, (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862 at 863. See also
Robinson, Admiralty, 424-425 (1939).
s See e.g. Connor, "Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-Currents of Theory," 54
Mich. L. Rev. 777 at 779 et seq., in which it is pointed out that the "proprietary
interest" theory is defective in that it fails to account for the fact that a property
interest, once accrued, suddenly becomes less valuable by occurrence of one later
in time. The "benefit" theory is also criticized on the ground that it breaks down
when applied to certain liens, such as the tort or collision lien. At 781, the author
states: "The effect of either of these theories, if rigidly applied, would be to encour-
age the utmost diligence in enforcement .... It would not matter that the earlier
lienors had no opportunity to enforce their claims by reason of the vessel being out
of reach. In fact a literal adherence to the principle would mean that all class
rankings would have to give way."
9 Connor, "Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-Currents of Theory," 54 Mich. L.
Rev. 777 at 781 (1956). See e.g. The Proceeds of the Gratitude, (D.C. N.Y. 1883)
17 F. 653; Todd Shipyards v. City of Athens, (D.C. Md. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 67.
10 See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 9-61 (1957).
11 (D.C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 862 at 863. This ranking was cited with approval
in Todd Shipyards v. City of Athens (D.C. Md. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 67.
12 41 Stat. 1000 (1920); 46 U.S.C.A. § 911 et seq. An excellent discussion of
the priorities provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act is found in Gilmore and Black,
The Law of Admiralty, § 9-68 (1957).
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and recorded, is given priority over all maritime liens except "preferred
maritime liens": (1) liens arising before recordation, and (2) any lien
of certain specified types, most notably the tort and salvage liens. 13
Qualification must perhaps also be made to the assignment of junior
rank to non-maritime claims: an exception has often been said to
exist in favor of governmental liens, although recent decisions may
not bear this out. This topic will receive further consideration below.
As with common law, there is no assurance that a given court will
be prepared to follow these suggested lines of maritime priority. Excep-
tions and complications constantly arise. But the aviation law practi-
tioner may at least draw upon the admiralty decisions for certain
guideposts of priority: (1) priority varies inversely with time; (2)
maritime claims outrank non-maritime claims; (3) among themselves,
maritime claims are generally ranked by class; and (4) perfected mort-
gages, while junior in rank to all earlier liens, outrank most subsequent
maritime liens.
THE AIRCRAFT: LIEN-GIVING TRANSACTIONS
The fundamental common law and maritime systems of priority
provide a background for the further inquiry: What transactions pecul-
iar to the aircraft itself give rise to a lien claim therein? Obviously,
the fact that most airplanes today are chattels of considerable value
means that long-term financing by mortgage or conditional sale will
be necessary, as in the case of land purchase. Thus the common law
priority problems involving secured holders and later lienors imme-
diately become pertinent. On the other hand, a similarity between the
aircraft and the ship as a mode of conveyance will often mean that the
same transactions which traditionally are recognized as giving a mari-
time lien may also be the basis for a lien in aircraft. Then, too, devel-
opment. of the aircraft lien law may validate certain claims for which
there is no precise parallel in either the common law or maritime law
systems.
1. Secured financing. devices. While their specific terms vary dras-
tically, security' instruments affecting title to aircraft or aircraft parts
may be conveniently grouped under a single heading, since they are
generally treated alike by the courts for priority purposes.14 At present,
13 See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 922, 953.
14 While a distinction may be drawn between the type of security transaction
in which title is retained by the seller or lender, as in the conditional sale, and in
which title passes to the borrower, as in the mortgage normally, all security trans-
actions are treated alike by the federal' aircraft lien recordation act, 53 Stat. 1006
(1938); 49 U.S.C.A. § 523. Decisions involving aircraft liens and their priority
have given no indication that a distinction is made, and the assumption is that this
is not the practice. It must be pointed out, however, that a distinction between the
equipment trust and the conditional sale or mortgage does exist, by virtue of a
recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Public Law 85-295, 71 Stat. 617 (1957),
approved Sept. 4, 1957 amends § 116 of the Act to permit more favorable treat-
ment in receivership proceedings of the trustee under an aircraft equipment trust.
In brief, the amendment permits the parties to an equipment trust to exempt, by
contract, the holders thereof from the application of § 116, by which a reorganiza-
tion court has authority to permit rejection of executory contracts, authorize issu-
ance of certificates of indebtedness, authorize lease and sale of property of the
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the mortgage, conditional sale, and equipment trust are the most
common forms of security device used for purchase or borrowing by
airlines and individual owners. 5 Each of these instruments, when
properly recorded under section 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, gives
rise to a lien which may be asserted against parties other than the
borrower, as well as the latter.1
2. Government penalty liens. Violation by the owner or person in
command of the aircraft of certain provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act regarding registration of aircraft, safety certification, postal regu-
lations under the Act, and navigation regulations, will subject the
aircraft to a lien for a civil penalty.17 Proceedings in rem directly
against the aircraft are authorized by the Act, and the aircraft may be
held until the penalty is satisfied. A similar lien may also arise for
violation of the Attorney General's regulations designating ports of
entry for aircraft, again in the event that the violation is by the owner
or person in command of the aircraft.'
3. Government tax liens. Sections 3670-3672 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code provide that if certain conditions are met by the federal
government, a lien for unpaid taxes shall arise "in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or per-
sonal," belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.' Such a lien arises with-
out regard to solvency, and attaches at the time the assessment list is
received by the collector. Varying state statutes, of course, similarly
provide with respect to unpaid state taxes. 20
4. Liens for tort. While there has never developed in aviation law
a lien for collision damages strictly paralleling the maritime collision
lien, many states have enacted uniform "ground damage" legislation
providing lien in favor of a party injured by an aircraft or objects
falling therefrom.21 As originally enacted, many of these statutes im-
posed strict tort liability upon anyone owning an interest in the aircraft
and permitted a lien upon all interests in the aircraft to the extent of
the damage, thereby discouraging much-needed financing of the airline
debtor, and enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement or continuation of a
suit against the debtor. Equipment trust creditors would be able, under the amend-
ment, to take immediate possession of their security in the event of receivership.
See H. Rep. 944, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). As was pointed out in Adkins andBillyou, "Developments in Aircraft Equipment Financing," 13 The Business Lawyer
199 (1958), this advantage was not extended to the mortgagee. Thus to a limited
extent, financing by the equipment trust has an advantage over other forms of
security transaction.
15 See Adkins and Billyou, "Developments in Aircraft Equipment Financing,"
13 The Business Lawyer 199 et seq. (1958).16 52 Stat. 1006 (1938) ; 49 U.S.C.A. (1952) § 523(c). The federal recordation
statute will be referred to as § 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act in this article.
17 52 Stat. 1017 (1938); 49 U.S.C.A. (1952) § 623.
18 66 Stat. 203 (1952); 8 U.S.C.A. (1952) § 1229.
'9 53 Stat. 448-49 (1953) ; 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3670-3672. The leading recent discus-
sion of this subject is found in Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal
Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien," 63 Yale
L. J. 905 (1954).
20 See e.g. Pa. Stat. Ann. (1949), Tit. 72 § 3341; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1951)
Art. 7083 (b) (1).
21 See e.g. Del. Code Ann. (1953) Ch. 2, § 305; S. C. Code Laws (1952) § 2-6;
Vt. Stats. (1947) § 5304.
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industry. In 1948, however, federal legislation relieved the situation
by providing that persons having a security interest in any civil aircraft
would not be liable to such tort claims "unless such aircraft is in the
actual possession or control of such person at the time of such injury,
death, damage, or lOss."22 As to other owners, however, the statutes
remain effective.
5. Liens for wages. Although maritime courts have traditionally
given sacred status to the lien of the seaman for wages, 23 the only court
which has been called upon directly to consider an analogous claim in
an aircraft rejected it summarily. In Greer V. Davis Air Lines, Inc.,24
it was held that a pilot is not entitled to a lien for his services in oper-
ating the aircraft. This holding, however, was based strictly upon the
court's interpretation of the scope of the state statute granting priority
to "laborer's liens" over an antecedent mortgage. Finding that one
asserting a laborer's lien must establish that in the labor performed the
manual or physical work preponderated over the intellectual powers,
the court held that the work of a pilot was in the nature of a profession
and more of an art or calling than mere skilled or unskilled labor.25
Thus, the court said, plaintiff was not a laborer within the meaning of
the statute.
The result is interesting in that while there is no indication that
the court considered the maritime analogy, it has been held that the
seaman's lien upon the vessel for wages is not to be extended to the
master,26 whose relation to the ship as commander is quite similar to
that of the pilot to his aircraft. It is to be doubted, however, that the
distinction between master and crew in admiralty will ever be carried
over to the aviation area, (1) because the chance is extremely unlikely
that an appropriate fact situation, viz, one involving a claimed lien for
stewardess' wages, will ever arise, and (2) because there is no reason
today for a court to invoke in favor of aircraft crew members the
ancient notion of the admiralty courts as protector of the uneducated
and defenseless seaman.
6. Repairman's liens. Abundant state legislation, apart from the
common law lien in favor of the artisan or repairman, is found provid-
22 62 Stat. 470 (1948) ; 49 U.S.C.A. § 524. "Provisions of present Federal and
State law might be construed to impose upon persons who are owners of aircraft for
security purposes only, or who are lessors of aircraft, liability for damages caused
by the operation of such aircraft even though they have no control over the opera-
tion of the aircraft. This bill would remove this doubt by providing clearly that such
persons have no liability under such circumstances. The relief thus provided from
potential unjust and discriminatory liability is necessary to encourage such persons
to participate in the financing of aircraft purchases." H. Rep. 2091, 80th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1948).
23 Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 525 at 529 (1958). An early Supreme Court decision
making this determination is Sheppard v. Taylor, 30 U.S. 675 (1831).
24 (Ga. Mun. Ct. 1930) 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 302. See also, for a case indicating
the same tendency, Jones v. Bodkin, 172 Okla. 38, 44 P. (2d) 38 (1935).
25 Greer v. Davis Air Lines, Inc., (Ga. Mun. Ct. 1950) 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 302.
26 The Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. 175 (1837). See, however, Robinson,
Admiralty 369 (1940) where the English rule to the contrary is discussed. The
master is given, under American law, a lien upon the freight of his vessel. The
Spartan, (D.C. Me. 1828) Fed. Cas. No. 4085.
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ing the private or municipal aircraft repairman with a lien for the
contract price or reasonable value of his services. 27 In some instances,
it is required that for liens in excess of a certain amount to be operative,
actual notice must have been given to, and consent obtained from, the
legal owner or mortgagee. 8 These statutes operate only in favor of the
repairman who contracts with the owner or operator, and not in favor
of the repairman's employees.2 9 To qualify for a lien upon the aircraft,
services must have been performed thereon, and not on some part
which subsequently finds its way onto the aircraft.30 Similarly, a servant
of the aircraft owner who supplies the aircraft with gas and oil pursuant
to instructions for ordinary operations is not entitled to a repairman's
lien under a statute requiring that there be "protection, improvement,
safe-keeping, or carriage" of the aircraft. 31
7. Storage lien. Drawing by analogy from the common law bailee's
lien and the maritime wharfage lien, a large number of state legisla-
tures have specifically granted a statutory lien for the storage and safe-
keeping of aircraft.32 These provisions most often appear in conjunc-
tion with the repairman's lien, and are frequently limited to municipal
storage facilities. While it might appear logical that even in the absence
of such a statute, a person with whom the owner of the aircraft has
contracted for storage would be entitled to a lien for use of his facili-
ties, common law courts were slow to recognize such a lien.33 A bailee
may, however, be able to convince a court that he falls within the broad
statutory language granting a lien to "garagemen" or for "storage,"
where the statute makes no specific mention of hangar facilities for
aircraft. 3 4
27 Ala. Ccde Ann. (1940) Tit. 4, § 29; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) § 74-605; Cal.
Code Civil Proc. (1953) § 1208.61 as amended by 1957 Laws Ch. 452; Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1953) § 5-5-4(3) ; Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) C. 178 § 62; Md. Ann. Code
(1951) § 1A-24; Mass. Ann. Laws (1956) C. 255, § 31E; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§ 570.303; Mont. Rev. Codes (1947) § 1-813; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1952) § 2A-
44-2; N. Y. Consol. Stat. (1940) Lien Law § 184; 3 Okl. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 65.6;
Tenn. Acts (1957) Ch.. 374 § 7(e) (3) ; Wyo. Sess. Law (1957) Ch. 215.
28 See e.g. Cal. Code Civil Proc. (1953) § 1208.62.
29 In Ross v. Spaniol, 122 Or. 424, 251 P. 900 (1927), employees of the contract-
ing repairman were denied a lien, the court saying at 430: ".... the work for which
the lien was claimed was not done at the request of the owners, but at the request
of Woodruff, their employer. There was no privity of contract such as was required
at common law between the owners and said employees. . . ." A dissenting opinion
in the case was filed, making a broader interpretation of the statute under which
the plaintiffs made their claim.
30 Modern Air Transport, Inc. v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., (N.J. Super. 1952)
90 A. (2d) 108. The court was called upon to interpret the scope of a statute giving
the repairman of the aircraft a lien. The court stated, at 109: "It is clear that no
lien is given for repairing a piece of machinery which may have been part of an
aircraft, or may become such a part, or is suitable for such use. No lien is given
for repairing an aircraft part."
31 Jones v. Bodkin, 172 Okla. 38, 44 P. (2d) 38 (1935).
32 See e.g. Ala. Code Ann. (1940) Tit. 4, § 29; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §
5-5-4 (3). Most of the statutes cited in note 27 supra grant the same lien for aircraft
storage.
33 See Brown, Personal Property (2nd ed.) § 108 (1936). The reason com-
monly advanced for such a result is that an owner's right to remove his chattel at
will negates the possessory aspect of the common law lien.
34 A typical statute is Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) § 87.085.
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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND SALES
With this preliminary view of the possible liens which may be
asserted against an aircraft, we are now in a position to discuss priority
relationships among these charges. As is to be expected, the greatest
number of statutes and decisions deal with the seniority between
sellers or holders of security interests on the one hand, and subsequent
lien claimants on the other. It is to this particular contest that the
present section is devoted.
1. In general. By far the most significant and comprehensive single
piece of legislation enacted to cope with aircraft lien priority and
notice problems is the federal recordation statute, first passed by Con-
gress in 1938 as section 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.35 Until that
time, considerable uncertainty and confusion had been created by the
heterogeneous state recording acts, particularly in cases where an air-
craft, upon which a security interest had been recorded in one state,
was flown to another state for repairs, storage, or maintenance. Many
of the statutes provided that proper recordation of a security interest
was constructive notice of a prior interest in the aircraft, when in fact
there was no actual notice and the means of discovering prior interests
were exceedingly difficult and unreliable.8 6 The problem was accent-
uated by the extreme facility with which an aircraft could be flown
from the state of recordation to one far removed therefrom.
Congress' partial solution was to require, for effective notice to
subsequent potential lienors, central recordation of aircraft title and
security interests with the Civil Aeronautics Authority in Washington.
After authorizing the C.A.A. to set up such a system, the provision
stated:
"(c) No conveyance the recording of which is provided for ...
shall be valid in respect of such aircraft ...against any person
other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument
is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any persons having actual
notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed
for recordation in the office of the Administrator. 37
Upon compliance with the recordation requirement, further recorda-
tion with another agency or governmental unit was unnecessary for
validity.8 The state recording acts, therefore, were tacitly superseded.
After ten years of successful operation of the new central recorda-
tion system for aircraft interests, Congress amended the provision to
permit similar notice of liens in aircraft engines and spare parts.8 9
This amendment further broadened the airlines' credit position, plac-
35 Note 16 supra.
86 See Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 1248 (1948).
37 Note 16 supra, § 523 (c).
38 Ibid., . 523 (d) : ".... each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means
of or under the system provided for ... shall from the time of filing be valid as to
all persons without further or other recordation ....
89 See 62 Stat. 494 (1948). For the regulations presently in force under the
statute, see 20 F.R. 301 (1955), 14 C.F.R. Part 503; 20 F.R. 3302 (1955), 14 C.F.R.
Part 504; 20 F.R. 4321 (1955), 14 C.F.R. Part 505.
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ing them in a better position to borrow against their substantial in-
vestments in stand-by equipment. As was recently indicated, however,
the amendment also posed problems with respect to (1) identification
of recorded spare parts and (2) possibly conflicting priority between
security interests in the aircraft to which a part might become attached,
and the lien' on the part itself. These are refinements which have yet to
be judicially considered, although sensible suggestions for their solu-
tion are already proposed or in operation. 40
It was immediately apparent that for the central recording system
to be effective, it would have to extend to all domestic aircraft, includ-
ing those used solely in intrastate operations. Congress' power under
the Commerce clause left no doubt as to the validity of the recordation
section for interstate aircraft. Shortly following the enactment of the
provision, however, a decision was handed down in a lower New York
court, in Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner,41 declaring section 503
unconstitutional to the extent that it required recordation of interests
in intrastate-operated aircraft.
This holding passed unchallenged until a similar problem arose
eight years later in In re Veteran's Air Express Co.,42 where priority
between an antecedent federally-recorded mortgage and a subsequent
repairman's lien upon an intrastate aircraft was at issue in a reorgani-
zation proceeding. Observing that the Gardner decision had held sec-
tion 503 to be unconstitutional in its intrastate application, the New
Jersey federal district court flatly rejected such a theory. The court
upheld the statute in its application to intrastate aircraft by analogy
to earlier Supreme Court decisions recognizing congressional control
over navigation as a part of commerce. Since, the court said, the
enunciated test of navigability-"affording channels of communication
among the States or for commerce with foreign countries"-may be
logically applied in the case of aircraft navigation as well, then "Con-
gress has control over navigation in the air .... Such navigation con-
stitutes commerce as surely as does the carriage of passengers and goods
by water .... The only-further comment required is to point out the
40 Adkins and Billyou, "Developments in Aircraft Equipment Financing," 13
The Business Lawyer 199 at 203 et seq. (1958): "It is customary to include in the
chattel mortgage or conditional sale agreement a comprehensive description of the
various types of spare parts (at least those of major importance) and to specify as
locations all the airports served by the air carrier in question and any other depots
where such spare parts may be kept. So far, it has not been necessary to test in
litigation the effectiveness of the lien on spare parts perfected by such recordation.
"Where there are mortgages or conditional sale agreements covering different
aircraft operated by the same carrier, because of the importance of having every-
thing physically attached to a particular aircraft at the time of default subject
to the same lien, provision is sometimes made for the interchangeability of liens.
The effect of such a provision is that the lien of a particular mortgage on any
particular spare part which becomes attached to an aircraft subject to another
mortgage will be deferred to the lien of the other mortgage so long as the spare
part remains so attached. Such a provision is probably operative under a chattel
mortgage but raises question under conditional sale agreements since the conditional
sale vendor probably is not a vendor of all the spare parts which became attached
to his aircraft."
41174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 37 (1940).
42 (D.C. N.J. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 684.
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incontestible conclusion that Congress has the full power to control
all aviation activity, since there is no section of the navigable circum-
ambient atmosphere of the United States which is not a part of 'a
continuous channel for commerce among the states or with foreign
countries.' -4 The court also hinted at a second ground for extension
of the federal recordation system to intrastate aircraft-one which is
finding increasing sympathy in the Supreme Court: "Unquestionably,
attempted restriction of Federal rights by over-clamorous and undue
insistence on States rights add nothing to the importance of the State,
and by hampering the Activities of the National Government destroy
the effectiveness of its operation in the matters which concern all of
the people."'44 Thus the court invoked the argument of United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 45 that in some instances it may well be necessary
to regulate purely intrastate commerce in order to insure the effective
operation of an interstate program.
Although the reasoning of the court has been subjected to con-
siderable criticism among the commentators 46 the result of the case
on the constitutional issue has not been challenged, and indeed has
been approved by courts subsequently having occasion to decide the
same question.47 When one considers the mobility and transitory status
ofthe modern aircraft, the necessity for inclusion of all civil aircraft
in the central recordation system is readily apparent. It is submitted,
therefore, that the constitutional determination of In re Veteran's Air
Express Co. is correct and would be upheld by the Supreme Court on
principles analogous to those suggested in the Darby decision.
2. Meaning of Section 503. Accepting the constitutional validity
of the section, we are then faced with the more important question-
what priority in right is obtained by a security holder through federal
recordation? Clearly it is not axiomatic that recordation assures priority
as to subsequent lienors, and the statutory language cannot be con-
strued in such a way as to leave the matter free from doubt. The statute
merely provides that conveyances or other instruments filed for re-
cordation "shall be valid as to all persons. . . ." It does not speak in
positive terms of priority, as does for instance the Ship Mortgage Act
of 1920 discussed above.
Again it was Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner which first inter-
preted the meaning of section 503. In that case, the issue presented
involved the respective rank of an antecedent federally-recorded mort-
43 Ibid., at 690.
44 Ibid.
45 "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regu-
lation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce."
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 at 118 (1941). Cf. United States
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).46 See Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 1248 (1948) ; Note, 10 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 79 at 80
et seq. (1948).
47 Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E. (2d) 610 (1949); Dawson v.
General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E. (2d) 653 (1950).
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gage on an intrastate aircraft, and the lien of a judgment creditor of
the mortgagor seeking to levy upon the aircraft. The court held that
failure by the mortgagee to record his interest in accordance with state
lien laws barred him from claiming priority by virtue of constructive
notice, and rendered judgment for the levying creditor.
It remained for the Veteran's Air Express court to challenge the
validity of this conclusion. Faced with the competing claims of a
mortgagee whose lien had been federally recorded, and a subsequent
lienor for repairs upon an intrastate aircraft, the court found that the
lien of the mortgagee was senior. In so holding, it rejected the repair-
man's assertion of priority based upon common law principles and the
local statutes, stating that since the federal recordation act extends to
intrastate aircraft, the lien claimed thereunder was senior to any claim
established by state law affecting the same object. Significant to this
holding, however, is the fact that the mortgagee here in the case was
the United States government. The court appeared to place considerable
emphasis4s upon its conception of the high position of government
liens and indeed, to the extent that the mortgagee is a federal agency,
equated passage of the recordation statute with establishment of prior-
ity for the recording party.
While the court is undoubtedly correct that Congress may establish
the priority of its liens with respect to liens asserted by private indi-
viduals under state statutes or by virtue of common law, one may
seriously question whether it intended to do so in this instance. The
purpose of the statute was reportedly to eliminate confusion engen-
dered by a multitude of state recording systems by providing a single
basis for constructive notice 4 9 not to establish the priority of a recorded
security interest over all subsequent claims. The only situation in
which priority appears to be determined by operation of the statute is
where the security holder has failed to record his interest. Such failure
invalidates the conveyance as to innocent third persons.5 ° But recorda-
tion itself merely validates; it does not grant priority. Certainly there
is much respectable authority in this country preferring the lien of the
artisan to that of the antecedent holder of a recorded security, either
on a theory of implied consent or agency. 51 There is no indication that
Congress intended to overrule such authority by passing section 503.
The only other federal court to consider a similar problem with
respect to section 503 failed to demonstrate the confidence, indicated
48 "Since, then, this court is of the opinion that the regulatory provisions of
recordation in accordance with the Civil Aeronautics Act is within the scope of
proper application of Federal law in a field of Federal competence, the lien claimed
by the United States of America is senior to any claim established under a State
law affecting the same object. No condition or requirement, inconsistent with the
expressed will of Congress in matters such as this over which it has constitutional
authority may be established by any state in derogation of the rights and interests
of the United States ... ." In re Veteran's Air Express Co., (D.C. N.J. 1948) 76 F.
Supp. 684 at 691.
49 Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
9738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 405 (1938).50 Note 16 supra, §§ 523 (c), 523 (d).
51 Brown, Personal Property (2nd ed.) § 112 (1936).
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in Veteran's Air Express Co., that federal recordation provided priority.
In United States v. United Aircraft Corp.,52 a case arising before the
aegis of the section was extended to aircraft engines, the court was
called upon to determine priority between a federally-recorded mort-
gage asserted by the United States, and a subsequent lien for repairs
to aircraft engines. The court dodged the central priority issue of the
Veteran's case by holding that the mortgage insufficiently described
the engines to provide fair notice to subsequent potential lienors and
was therefore void as to third parties, under the mandate of the federal
statute.53 The repairman was thus preferred, not because the court
found him prior in right to the recording mortgagee, but because the
mortgage itself was no basis upon which to assert a valid lien. The
court explicitly stated that it did not reach the question of whether
an artificer's lien can take precedence over a valid government lien,
but in dicta did remark that there appeared to be no crippling danger
to the United States as holder of security for a debt, in applying the
same rules of priority as are applied to the ordinary citizen. This lan-
guage would appear to take specific exception to the reasoning of the
Veteran's case that preference for a lien created under state law would
constitute interference with federal lien supremacy. The United Air-
craft decision by no means rejected the idea that an artificer's lien may
take precedence over an antecedent properly-recorded mortgage, saying
"it may well have been the intent of the contracting parties to the
mortgage that an artisan's lien should have priority over the rights of
mortgagee." 54
3. Priority of the security interest. If we then accept the apparent
thesis of the United Aircraft decision that the federal recordation
statute does not purport to affect or change existing priority doctrines
by its terms, our next question must necessarily be: Which is senior,
a recorded mortgage or a subsequent lien upon the aircraft? As one
may surmise, the decisions on this point are by no means uniform, and
perhaps the best answer that can be given is that seniority will depend
upon the nature of the subsequent claim asserted.
a. As against the debtor himself. Whether it is recorded or not, the
security transaction instrument, if contractually valid, binds the pur-
chaser or borrower, his assigns and devisees, and persons with actual
notice of the transaction.5 It has been specifically held under section
503 that failure to record does not void a conveyance as between
buyer and seller.56 To this extent, perhaps, the statute does affect
"priority" in a loose sense.
b. As against subsequent purchasers. It is relatively clear that where
52 (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52. Noted, 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 435 (1949).
5 The court felt that the description in the mortgage of the aircraft did not
sufficiently identify the engine upon which the work was done.
54 United States v. United Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52
at 55.
55 Failure to record does not invalidate the transaction under Section 503 as
against these persons. Note 16 supra.56 Bishop v. R. S. Evans East Point, Inc., 80 Ga. App. 324, 56 S.E. (2d) 134
(1949).
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the right asserted by the subsequent claimant is that, of title based
upon a sale from the original borrower or mortgagor, a mortgagee who
has retained title and who has caused the conveyance to be properly
recorded with the C.A.A. will prevail, although there is no actual
notice of outstanding title to the subsequent purchaser. In Dawson v.
General Discount Corp.,57 the court stated that defendant, "before
purchasing, had the opportunity to ascertain the paramount outstand-
ing title by checking the records of the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
This being so, his title to the aircraft was inferior to that of plain-
tiff. . . ." That a similar result would have been reached had the first
security-holder's interest been merely in the nature of a lien rather
than title itself, there should be no doubt. A mere purchaser from the
borrower, it would appear, has a clear duty to search title of his vendor
or be subordinated to previously recorded interests in the aircraft.58
Such a result is a clear expression of the basic common law priority
rule that between conflicting titles based upon transfer from the same
source, qui prior est tempore potior est jure: stated otherwise, no-one
can transfer a greater right than he himself has.59
When, on the other hand, the first purchaser or security-holder
neglects to record his interest, the common law rule is forgotten and
his interest is declared by section 503 invalid against all but the bor-
rower, his successors, and persons with actual notice of the transaction.
Thus in Blalock v. Brown,60 where there was no showing that the
second purchaser had actual notice of the previous but unrecorded
sale, the court held that the claim of the second purchaser was to be
preferred under the federal recordation statutory provisions.
c. As against subsequent attaching creditors. When the subsequent
claimant is merely an attaching creditor, but the security holder has
neglected to record his interest, the common law rule is again disre-
garded. Thus in Wilson v. Barnes,61 in which the purchaser of ten
aircraft failed to have the sale instrument recorded and the goods were
then attached by a creditor of the vendor having no actual notice of
the sale, the court held that absence of constructive notice of the pre-
vious interest prevented the purchaser from asserting better title.
Contra, however, is Marshall v. Anderson,6 2 where the court held that
failure of the first purchaser to have his title recorded would not bar
him from asserting his title against a subsequent creditor attaching
the aircraft for a debt owing from the original vendor based on an
independent transaction. The court noted that there was no showing
that the attaching creditor was defrauded or misled by the omission
5782 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E. (2d) 653 (1950).
58 Jones, Mortgages, § 670 (1914) ; Jones, Chattel Mortgages, § 236 et seq.
(1908).
59 See excellent discussion of basic common-law priority doctrines in Durfee,
Cases on Security (3rd ed.) 248 et seq. (1934).
60 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E. (2d) 610 (1949). See also United States v. All-
American Airways, Inc., (9 Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 592.
61359 Mo. 352, 221 S.W.(2d) 731 (1949).
62 169 Kan. 534, 220 P. (2d) 187 (1950).
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to record, since he did not rely on the federal records. Finding that at
least equitable title was in the purchaser, the court stated that it would
not seem fair or logical to prefer the attaching creditor, who according
to the common law doctrine could acquire no greater right in the
property seized than his debtor.
It is submitted that the Wilson result is to be preferred as giving
effect to the express wording of the federal recordation statute, "no
conveyance shall be valid . . . until such conveyance . . . is filed for
recordation in the office of the Administrator." 63 It is difficult to see
how the Marshall court could construe such language to prefer the
purchaser who has failed to record. An exception to the mandate of
the statute is made only when the party asserting invalidity of pur-
chaser's title is borrower himself, his heirs or devisees, or a person with
actual notice of the transaction. 64 An attaching creditor is normally
none of these.
The value of a central recording system is in its reliability: if an
instrument is recorded there, the whole world is deemed to have con-
structive notice thereof; if it is not, then no title exists. Actual reliance
by a subsequent attaching creditor is not made by the statute a pre-
requisite to assertion of "priority," and should not be demanded by
the courts.
d. As against subsequent repairmen. Where the subsequent claim
is based upon a lien for repairs, the decisions are less clear. The only
decision besides In re Veteran's Air Express to rule upon the point
directly since passage of the federal recordation statute is Anderson v.
Triair Associates, Inc.65 in a lower Wisconsin court. There, despite the
fact that the mortgage had been filed with the Civil Aeronautics
Authority, the court held that a repairman was not required to inquire
concerning the existence of a mortgage filed or recorded with the
C.A.A. under section 503, or filed in a county in another state. To the
contrary, "one making repairs and thereby preserving the value of
personal property from disintegration or destruction is upon principle
entitled to priority over any other lien which is not actually known to
the mechanic making the repairs or for which he is not charged with
knowledge constructively under the statutes of the state."66 The court
felt that it was inequitable to charge repairmen, often making repairs
under emergency conditions and materially enhancing the value of the
property, with constructive notice of mortgages filed perhaps long
distances from where the repairs are made. A similar result was reached
prior to the passage of a federal recordation system in Boise Flying
Service v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,67 where the antecedent
mortgage was recorded in a state other than the one in which the
repairs were made.
63 Note 16 supra.
64 Ibid.
65 (C.C. Wis. 1947) 149 U.S. Av. Rep. 440.
66 Ibid., at 448.
67 Boise Flying Service v. G.M.A.C., 56 Ida. 5, 36 P. (2d) 813 (1934).
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In another pre-1938 decision, Atlas Securities Co. v. Ramsey,68
however, preference was given to the antecedent security holder despite
the fact that he had failed to register his instrument under the old
non-exclusive federal registration system. Such an omission today
would no doubt have been fatal to his interest, and the subsequent
repairman would have obtained priority in any event, since section
503 purports to affect priority to the extent of invalidating instru-
ments not properly recorded. But the decision is significant in that it
places emphasis upon the notice-giving aspect of a central recordation
system as a basis for priority. The court, in preferring the non-record-
ing security holder, appeared to rely strongly on the failure of the
repairman to search the records. A legitimate inference from the de-
cision is that if a diligent search by the repairman had not disclosed
the earlier interest, he would have been successful in obtaining first
priority. Such emphasis upon the notice aspect of recordation, together
with the court's preference from the antecedent security-holder where
both parties may be said to have been remiss, leads one to believe that
the Atlas judges today would be willing to grant seniority to the
antecedent holder in any event, once he filed his interest for record
with the federal government. This, of course, is a result akin to that
in In re Veteran's Air Express, although the reasoning of the two courts
cannot be said to be similar. Together, however, the two decisions may
be said to represent the view that the antecedent security-holder is to
be preferred if his lien has been properly recorded, contrasting the
opposite tendency in the Anderson and Boise cases above.
Aside from this case law on the subject, one finds a limited amount
of legislation dealing with the contest -between antecedent security
interests and subsequent liens. While there can be little question that
the states recognize federal pre-emption of the aircraft recordation
field, a number of states have not interpreted section 503 as preventing
them from continuing to declare priority with respect to liens arising
upon aircraft within the state. Still in force in Alabama is a statute
granting first priority to liens of municipal airports for supplies, re-
pairs, and storage-with an exception in favor of local tax liens."9
Maine allows a repairman's lien "which takes precedence of all other
claims and incumbrances on said ... aircraft ... not made to secure a
similar lien ... "70 In Maryland, on the other hand, the importance
of federal recordation has been recognized. With reference to mate-
rialmen's liens, the Maryland statutes provide: "said lien shall be
subordinate only to the holder of a bill of sale, contract of conditional
sale, conveyance, mortgage, or assignment of mortgage for or on the
aircraft . . . which has been executed and recorded with the Adminis-
trator of Civil Aeronautics .... -71 Michigan grants similar priority
to the security holder upon payment to the repairman of up to $400.00,
68 262 Ill. App. 559 (1931).
69 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) Tit. 4, § 29.
70 Maine Rev. Stat. (1954) C. 178, § 62.
71 Md. Code Ann. (1951) § 1A-24.
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which amount may then be added to the amount of the security-holder's
lien.72 In New Jersey, which undoubtedly boasts the most comprehen-
sive statutory scheme governing aircraft liens, a repairman's lien in-
curred at the request of the owner, his representative, agent, or lessee,
is "superior to all other liens, except liens for taxes, and the operator
of such aircraft shall be deemed the agent of any owner, mortgagee,
conditional vendor, or other lienor thereof for the creation of such
superior lien. ' '73 To these statutes, which expressly deal with aircraft,
may be added a multitude of statutes in which priority is granted to
one party or the other without specific reference to the aircraft, 4 and
upon construction of which a court could be expected to extend its
operation to aircraft if asked to do so.
Where the subsequent claimant is a repairman, then, one is faced
with a confusing conflict in the decisions and the statutes. This is by
no means a novel situation: the argument concerning the opposing
seniority of the mortgagee or conditional vendor, on the one hand,
and the repairman on the other, has been raging for many years.75
The inconsistency of the results in the cases may be laid no doubt to
the fact that potentially, there are innumerable variables which may
come into play. Is the security-holder a conditional vendor who has
retained legal title, or is he merely a mortgagee with, in some juris-
dictions7 1 only a lien on the aircraft? Upon what basis does the repair-
man assert his claim-by virtue of common law or under a statute?
Has either party been guilty of laches or neglect? Was the security
instrument recorded? Was it sufficiently definite in its description?
Has there been an opportunity for actual notice? These factors, among
others, are both legal and equitable in nature, and because they are so
numerous, accurate prediction of what a court will do in a given situa-
tion will never be possible without specific statutory mandate.
A solution to the problem has been suggested by Professor Brown,
who has written:
"Might it not be better to recognize openly that the claim of the
subsequent mechanic or serviceman is not based on authority from
the mortgagee or vendor at all, but on quasi-contractual principles.
The subsequent claimant should be permitted to recover from the
prior mortgagee or conditional vendor for the reasonable value
contributed to the chattel in question by the former's services. In
such an event, of course, his lien would not necessarily be for the
price at which he had contracted, but only to the extent that the
mortgagee has benefited as a result of his services. 77
This suggestion has received occasional approval by the commentators,
72 Mich Comp. Laws (1948) § 570.301.
73N. J. Stat. Ann. (1952) § 2A:44-2.
74 The most recent compilation of states in which decisions have turned on
express statutory preference appears in annotations, 36 A.L.R. (2d) 198 and 36
A.L.R. (2d) 229 (1954).
75 See Brown, Personal Property (2nd ed.) § 112 (1936).
76 See Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, §§ 497-499 (1940).
77 Brown, Personal Property (2nd ed.) § 112 (1936).
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and has been adopted in modified form as to aircraft in at least one
state.
78
An additional possibility for solving the conflict is found in the
federal recordation statute itself. Section 503 (g) authorizes the Civil
Aeronautics Authority to provide by regulation for endorsement, upon
certificates of registration or aircraft safety certificates, of information
with respect to the ownership of the aircraft for which the certificate is
issued and of other information affecting title to the aircraft.7 9 The
Civil Aeronautics Authority has not enacted regulations to place this
scheme in effect, although it is reported that most aircraft security in-
struments "specifically require that notice of the existence of a security
interest be displayed in the aircraft, generally in close proximity to the
certificate of airworthiness, and frequently require that engines and
other important spare parts be appropriately marked." 80 Such a re-
quirement, if put into the form of a regulation, would make disclaimer
of actual notice by repairmen considerably more difficult. On the
present piecemeal basis, however, it is to be seriously questioned
whether the repairman can be said to owe a duty to check for such
notice upon each aircraft he services. In large-scale airline operation,
there is no doubt that such a system is effective; the smaller repairman,
however, has considerably less assurance that the title certificate dis-
played is either up to date or valid in its inception. The possibility
of forged certificates, particularly in the latter situation, poses a con-
tinual threat to the efficacy of this system of notice.
Although any suggested solution a fortiori belies the sympathies
of its author, the writer feels sufficiently compelled by the repairman's
equities to pose an alternative recommendation. That a central recorda-
tion system has provided a more efficient and trustworthy means of
determining aircraft ownership, few will doubt. But the constructive
notice provided by C.A.A. records in Washington, while of considerable
assistance to the larger corporate repair facility, is of little real value
to the hangar-keeper in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Called on to
furnish repairs to a small plane enroute from Minnesota to Oregon,
the Grand Forks repairman has three alternatives: (I) insist on a cash
transaction; (2) refuse to commence repairs until C.A.A. records
have been checked; or (3) take his chances. None is really attractive
to the entrepreneur in every case. Mortgagee or conditional vendor,
on the other hand, is fully aware that his security is in a highly mobile
instrument of transportation which may need frequent repairs and
servicing.
With considerations such as these in mind, it is perhaps possible
to suggest an effective solution to the competing interests of the
claimants. Such a solution is found in the applicable provision of the
78 Note 72 supra.
79 52 Stat. 1006 (1938); 49 U.S.C.A. 523(g) as amended 62 Stat. 494 (1948).
80 Adkins and Billyou, "Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment
Financing," 13 The Business Lawyer 199 at 205 et seq. (1958).
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Uniform Commercial Code, which appears perfectly tailored for the
aircraft priority problem:
"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien given by statute or rule of law for such materials
or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless
the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise."8 1
The author suggests that section 503 be amended by (1) the deletion
of sub-division (g) 82 as it presently stands; and (2) the substitution
therefor of the quoted provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This recommended change, it should be noted, assures a uniform
national rule to the extent that a repairman asserts a common law lien'
-his interest is prior to the holder of the security instrument. If a state
should desire to alter the rule, it could do so merely by setting up the
statutory basis upon which a repairman could acquire a lien in that
state, and prescribing the priority of that lien in relation to antecedent
security interests. The repairman, assured that he has priority under
the federal law, need only familiarize himself with the aberrations of
his own state's legislation. The mortgagee or vendor, aware that his
interest is normally to be considered junior to that of subsequent
artisans, will at the time of the original transaction with the borrower,
take such steps as he deems necessary to require adequate collateral
security. It may be that in any given instance, legislation of the state
in which repairs are made will give preference to the antecedent
security-holder's claim. If this is the case, then he is that much better
off. It may even be that a state will have adopted the compromise
solution suggested by Brown, so that the repairman will only be pre-
ferred to the extent of the amount by which he has benefitted the
security-holder by enhancing the aircraft. From the security-holder's
point of view, this is still better than the junior status for which he is
theoretically prepared.
The argument may no doubt be raised that such a system would
tend to discourage borrowing. There is little question that this is true,
but the author submits that the advantages accruing through certainty
of priority outweigh the possible deleterious effect that the change
would have upon aircraft financing.
In summary, the recommended provision gives preference to the
party less equipped to be certain of his security, in all cases where the
local statute does not declare otherwise. It defers to state power where
the state chooses to exercise it. Most important, perhaps, it encourages
the free flow of commerce through the assistance that it gives the re-
81 Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-310 (1952). Cf. Security Restatement § 76
(1941): "Subject to the provisions of recording statutes, where a lien exists in
consequence of the bailment of a mortgaged chattel or of a chattel held under a
conditional sales contract, the interest of the mortgagor is prior to that of any
lienor except a hotelkeeper . . .a landlord ... or a connecting carrier . .. unless
words or circumstances justify the inference that the mortgagee or conditional
vendor has consented to subordinate his interest."
82 Note 79 supra.
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pairman, where otherwise he might be reluctant to return an aircraft
to operating condition.
e. As against other claimants. In contrast to the relatively large
number of cases involving competing claims of repairmen and anteced-
ent security-holders, there is scant judicial pronouncement upon the
priority between the latter and claimants basing their liens on other
transactions. All that has been said of the repairman would appear to
have equal application to subsequent contract suppliers of shelter and
goods to the aircraft. Many of the state statutes awarding a lien to the
aircraft repairman do the same for the hangar-keeper.8 3 As to other
suppliers of services, however, it may be a fine question in each case
whether the supplier will actually come within the terms of the statute.
As mentioned previously, Section 504 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
passed in 1948, now prevents persons injured by the tortious conduct
of an aircraft operator from asserting their claims against those holding
a security interest in the aircraft, unless the latter are responsible for
the conduct.84 State statutes not expressly declaring this exception to
their "ground damage" statutes must be read with this in mind.
In United States v. Batre,8 5 decided in 1934, the court held that the
lien of the antecedent mortgagee was inferior to a subsequent penalty
lien of the government for violation of the immigration laws. The
court remarked that
"... if a lien created by a chattel mortgage is held superior to this
penalty lien, those so disposed can always evade it by mortgaging
the airplane up to or beyond its actual value, with the result that
the government would never collect the penalty and the law would
be without force .... An inspection of the act and the regulations
pursuant thereto further indicates that revenue alone is not the
sole purpose of the law. A firm hold upon the immigration, narcotic
drug trade, and protection to the public health is also contemplated."
It has been remarked that the result reached here is that which obtains
under the general admiralty laws in similar cases.8 6 There is consider-
able question as to the accuracy of such a statement. Indeed, in The
Melissa Trask s7 a government penalty claim was held inferior to the
interest of a preferred ship mortgage. Authority that the penalty lien
is senior is not to be found in the recent cases.88
As to government tax liens, however, the case may be different. In
The Melissa Trask, such a lien was held superior to the preferred
mortgage, because of the fundamental "policy of the government to
insist on priority for taxes."8 9 The holding of the court as to taxes has
83 Notes 27 and 32 supra.
84 Note 22 supra.
85 (9 Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 673.
86 Note, 5 J.A.L. 495 (1934).
87 (D.C. Mass. 1923) 285 F. 781. See also Fridlund, "Federal Taxes and Pre-
ferred Ship Mortgages," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 et seq. (1925).
88 The Thomaston, (D.C. Md. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 279; The Antigostine, 22 U.S.
409 (1824). Cf. The Mariam, (9 Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 899.
89 The Melissa Trask (D.C. Mass. 1923) 285 F. 781 at 783.
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been criticized severely,o0 and three more recent cases9' have held that
a tax claim of the United States is outranked even if it antedates a
maritime lien for supplies. Indeed, it has been suggested by excellent
authority that if government liens are to be permitted to upset an
already established system of maritime lien priority, the step should
be taken by Congress and not the courts . 2
While, then, there is little precedent from the admiralty courts that
government liens are to be preferred over the mortgage, there is some
logic in the Batre argument that postponement of the penalty lien
would defeat the policy of the statute. To a limited extent this is no
doubt true, but this argument ignores the facts that (1) it is not
normally the holder of the security who has violated federal regula-
tions; and (2) the civil penalty may be satisfied out of other property
of the offending party as well as the aircraft 3 Thus there appears little
justification for subordination of the security-holder to the government
penalty claim, when in fact the government has an alternative for
enforcement against the party actually responsible.
As to federal tax lien priority, no decision has as yet appeared
involving a tax lien as against an antecedent mortgage upon an air-
craft. Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes94 may give some hint as to
government policy on this point-it provides that debts owed by the
federal government by an insolvent person shall take first priority. The
Supreme Court, however, has indicated that a "specific and perfected"
lien will nevertheless take precedence, and thus far the government
has conceded that a perfected security instrument will qualify as prior 5
This concession has never been put to a judicial test.
It is suggested that the government lien for taxes should be given
the same priority position as to aircraft as the government penalty lien.
The holder of the security, presuming that he has properly recorded
his interest, should not be burdened with the financial misdeeds of
90 See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 622-624 (1957). See also 35
Yale L. J. 876 (1926).
91 The River Queen, (E.D. Va. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 426; The J. R. Hardee, (S.D.
Tex. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 379; Abraham H., (1 Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 209. The last
case, at 212, states: "Throughout the long history of the general maritime law,
maritime liens have uniformly been given preference over secured non-maritime
claims of other kinds, both prior and subsequent. The theoretical basis for the
primacy of maritime claims is that they 'attach to the vessel itself as an instrument
of commerce,' while other claims are derived only through the owner. Accordingly,
maritime liens have taken priority over claims of the United States when the vessel
has been forfeited to the government."
92 Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 624 (1957), cited with approval
in Abraham H. (1 Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 209. Cf. United States v. All-American
Airways, Inc., (9 Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 592 in which a federal tax lien upon an
aircraft, recorded in Washington State, was held not enforceable against the air-
craft in possession of a bona fide purchaser without notice in California.
03 52 Stat. 1017 (1938) ; 49 U.S.C.A. § 623(b) ; 66 Stat. 203 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1229. Violations of safety regulations are also punishable by criminal action. See
52 Stat. 1015 (1938); 49 U.S.C.A. § 622(h).
94 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875) ; 31 U.S.C.A. § 191. The discussion in this paper of
government tax lien priority is drawn substantially from the most recent compre-
hensive article upon the subject. Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal
Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien," 63 Yale
L. J. 905 (1954).
95 Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty § 9-73 (1957).
LIENS IN AIRCRAFT: PRIORITIES
his debtor which, in contrast with the possibility of potential repairs
to the aircraft, he has no reason to anticipate. The government still
has available to it the criminal sanction 96 and the possibility of levy
upon other property of the delinquent taxpayer. Congress has not
suggested priority for the tax lien beyond the case involving an insol-
vent person-until it does so, reason should dictate a junior status for
the government lien as against an antecedent security interest.
OTHER COMPETING CLAIMANTS
While it is not feasible to discuss suggested priorities for every
possible further situation in which two claimants have asserted com-
peting liens, it is possible to review the remaining decisions and statutes
affecting aircraft lien priorities which have appeared thus far.
One of the earliest, and perhaps the most interesting, of the de-
cisions is U. S. v. Curtiss-Robin Airplane NC-75-H,97 where liens
accrued in the following time sequence: government penalty lien for
operating the aircraft without a license, lien for aircraft storage, and
finally, lien for labor and material supplied in repairing the aircraft.
With a minimum of discussion, and without setting forth its reasons,
the court held that the claim for storage was superior to the claim for
repairs and labor, and that both were superior to the government
penalty lien. All the claims were inferior to the charges for court costs
-a finding entirely consistent with admiralty and bankruptcy prac-
tice."" The junior position assigned the government penalty lien would
appear to follow the same policy suggested as favoring its junior status
with respect to the antecedent mortgagee. There was no indication
that either the storage lienor or the repairman had constructive notice
of the penalty, and neither appeared to have been at fault in incurring
it.
The court's preference, however, for the storage lien over the re-
pairman's lien is more difficult to understand. It appears that the court
followed the common law time-right maxim in assigning priority be-
tween the two contract lienors. This does not strictly jibe with the
court's fixing of junior status for the penalty claim, which was prior in
point of time to either of the contract liens, if the court intended to
pursue the time-right maxim exclusively. At the risk of reading too
much into the decision, one may suggest that the court followed a
policy similar to that encountered in the admiralty courts. Occasionally
the case will arise under maritime law in which strict application of
priority based on time and priority based on class will bring differing
results, as where a claim for seaman's wages from an earlier voyage
competes with a claim for supplies from a later voyage. By application
of the inverse-time-right doctrine, the supplyman's lien is superior.
96 53 Stat. 440 (1954) ; 26 U.S.C.A. § 3616.
97 (D.C. Fla. 1932) 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 164.
98 See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 9-61 (1957) and the pri-
ority provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 563 (1898) ; 11 U.S.C.A. § 104.
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On the basis of class, however, the wage claim has priority. The ad-
miralty courts, in these instances, tend to follow the pr'iority system
dictated by the class of claim, subordinating the time priority system to
an inferior status.9 9 This appears to be what the court has done here.
First assigning priority by class, the court relegated the penalty lien to
junior position. Then, faced with choosing between two contract
claims for the senior position, it chose the lien which had accrued the
first. Because of the apparently deliberate choice exercised between
time and class priority by the court, the decision may well be one of
the best indications that class, rather than time, is the important factor
in determining aircraft lien priority.
In United States v. One Fairchild Seaplane,100 it was held that a
repairman furnishing repairs to a seaplane obtained a maritime lien
which took precedence over an antecedent lien for penalties asserted
by the federal government. This decision, in its class preference for
the repairer's lien over the penalty lien, is consistent with the holding
in Curtiss-Robin. It was reversed, however, in United States v. North-
west Air Service, Inc.,101 on the ground that the repairman had not
acquired a maritime lien and, on the authority of the Batre case,
because a penalty lien in favor of the United States is paramount to
ordinary liens of a non-maritime nature. It is suggested that this de-
cision is incorrect for the same reasons as those set out in the discussion
of the Batre case. Until Congress dictates otherwise, the better view
is found in the lower court and Curtiss-Robin opinions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent from the foregoing discussion that the subject
of lien priorities in aircraft is attended by as much confusion and un-
predictability as is the broader subject of priorities in general. The
courts and legislatures have drawn indiscriminately from common law
rules, admiralty precedents, and their own notions of equity in fash-
ioning a set of priority principles for application to security interests
in aircraft. If a count were taken, one might perhaps find a greater
tendency to subscribe to common law doctrines of time priority on the
one hand, and traditional maritime doctrines of class priority - the
Ship Mortgage Act excepted - on the other. The maritime concept
that "last in time is prior in right," fading in importance in the
admiralty courts themselves, does not appear to have received much
attention from courts and legislatures called upon to decide lien priori-
ties in aircraft. The later repairman is preferred in some places, not
because he sends the aircraft on its way to the advantage of prior
lienors, but because he has enhanced the value of the plane without
knowing whether the person with whom he contracts has the title that
99 See the excellent discussion in Connor, "Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-
Currents of Theory," 54 Mich. L. Rev. 777 at 816 (1956).
100 (D.C. Wash. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 579.
101 (9 Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 804.
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he purports to have. The common law time-right priority concept,
however, has received only slightly more deference. In the main, con-
tests have been between different classes of liens, with the time of
accrual of only subordinate interest.
Priority by class is obviously unsettled. One treatise suggests that
the following order of priority should be followed: (1) government
liens; (2) storage liens; (3) repairmen's liens; (4) mortgagee or con-
ditional seller interests. 10 2 For the reasons already indicated, the author
cannot subscribe to the seniority granted the government lien, nor
does it appear that there is substantial basis for differentiating the
storage and repair lien. If called upon to suggest a system of priority
that appears best to represent existing authority, the author would rank
the liens as follows: (1) court costs; (2) storage, materialmen's and
repairmen's liens; (3) recorded security interests; (4) government tax
and penalty liens; (5) unrecorded security interests. As between two
liens of the same class, priority would be determined upon a common
law time-right basis. Whether this suggested schedule actually repre-
sents a reconciliation of authority, or only wishful thinking, is a nice
question. It may perhaps more candidly be said that the authorities
are presently so few that no accurate picture may be drawn of their
state and tendency.
All that remains, then, is the recommendation for revision of Sec-
tion 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, to establish a system of priority
between the repairman and the antecedent recording security-holder.
Further definition of this, the most common dispute between aircraft
claimants, is deemed essential to full implementation of the federal
recording system. The author feels that the advantages of the suggested
change outweigh the disadvantages. It is hoped that aviation law prac-
titioners with considerably greater knowledge of the practical problems
involved than the author, will find the opportunity to examine this
suggestion and press or reject it, as sound consideration dictates.
102 Dykstra and Dykstra, The Business Law of Aviation 477 (1946).
